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How powerful are business interests in lobbying for changes to EU legislative proposals? Andreas
Dür, Patrick Bernhagen and David Marshall present ﬁndings from an analysis of 70 legislative
proposals introduced by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. They note that
contrary to popular opinion, business actors proved far less successful than citizen groups at
achieving their desired outcomes in EU legislative decisions. They reason that this may be because
with the single market completed in most areas, the contemporary European legislative agenda
tends to be dominated by proposals aimed at protecting consumers or the environment.
From legislation governing the safety of chemicals (REACH) to the EU’s current data protection
regulation, critics of business lobbying warn that corporate interests are highly inﬂuential in EU
legislative politics. But do business interests really pull the strings in Brussels? In the framework of
INTEREURO, a collaborative international study of lobbying in the EU, we took up the question of
business power in EU legislative politics. Our ﬁndings have just been published in a recent article in
Comparative Political Studies – also available as an ungated working paper.
Our result, at ﬁrst, seems surprising: Business interests are less successful, on average, in
achieving favourable policy outcomes in the EU than citizen groups that advocate issues such as
environmental protection or human rights. This result rests on highly labour-intensive empirical
research. We interviewed oﬃcials in the European Commission about a sample of 70 legislative
proposals introduced by that institution between 2008 and 2010. These interviews provided us with
data about the conﬂictive issues within the proposals and the positions of interest groups that
lobbied on these issues. We also recorded the positions of the Commission, the Council and the
European Parliament, as well as the locations of the status quo and the outcome of the decision-making process. In
total, we found 112 conﬂictive issues and 1,043 non-state advocates lobbying on these issues.
We used these data to calculate a measure of lobbying success, built on the idea that lobbyists are more successful
the more they manage to pull the outcome closer to their ideal points, relative to the status quo. The larger the
distance to the status quo, and the smaller the distance to the outcome, the more successful an actor should be
considered (and vice versa).
We then analysed variation across actors with respect to this success score. Controlling for a variety of factors such
as media attention, the actors’ endowment with relevant information, the distance between the actors’ ideal
positions and the European Commission’s position (and in some variations also distance to the Council majority and
distance to the majority in the European Parliament), and the number of actors pulling in the same direction, we
found that business actors are, on average, less successful than citizen groups. An illustration of our results is
shown in the chart below.
Chart: Average lobbying ‘success’ for citizen groups and business actors in the EU’s legislative process
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Note: The chart is based on
subtracting the percentage of
citizen groups/business
actors that ‘lost’ in their
attempts to inﬂuence a given
legislative proposal from the
percentage of groups that
‘won’ (based on the authors’
ordinal success ‘score’). In
this case, 65% of citizen
groups ‘won’ and 12% ‘lost’,
while only 39% of business
actors ‘won’ whereas 44%
‘lost’. For full calculations see
the authors’ longer paper.
While at ﬁrst sight this ﬁnding may be surprising, the fact that business inﬂuence on EU legislation is limited actually
makes sense. Contrary to citizen groups, business interests often lack a “natural ally” in contemporary EU legislative
decision-making. With the single market largely completed, much of the EU’s contemporary legislative activity is
about regulating the European market. In the mature European polity, proposals aiming to protect consumers or the
environment tend to dominate the legislative agenda.
On these proposals, business actors – often unanimously – defend the low regulation status quo. By contrast,
citizen groups, the European Commission and the European Parliament all tend to support these proposals. Beyond
substantive grounds, the European Commission has an incentive to advance these proposals as doing so gives it
the opportunity to strengthen or at least preserve its position vis-à-vis the other EU institutions.
With business actors thus confronting coalitions of citizen groups, the European Commission and the European
Parliament, it is not surprising that they often tend to lose. In fact, what we see is that nearly all of the proposals on
the EU’s legislative agenda get approved eventually. On most of these, we see a shift away from a low-regulation
status quo favoured by business interests towards a high-regulation state favoured by citizen groups.
This is exactly what we are witnessing in the case of the EU’s aforementioned data protection regulation. Although
not yet ﬁnally approved, it seems likely that the regulation will go through in 2015 despite strong business opposition
from large companies including Google, Facebook and Microsoft. The result, while probably less far-reaching than
the original Commission proposal, is unlikely to be a success for business. Business lobbying in the EU in this and
many other cases is of a defensive nature; we see so much of it because business actors face a loss that they try to
minimise.
What conclusion can we take away from this research? Overall, the project of European integration has been a
major success for European business. Business actors on average beneﬁtted from the liberalisation of intra-
European trade. In the current phase of European integration, however, the popular perception of powerful business
lobby groups likely overestimates the actual level of inﬂuence business exerts on EU legislation. On the whole,
business actors now appear to be less successful than citizen groups in achieving their desired policy outcomes.
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